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Introduction

There is a robust literature on how a nation’s infrastructure can promote economic growth,
further the goal of poverty reduction, facilitate movement of people and goods, provide energy
where it is needed, and improve a nation’s health.1 The literature also attests that although due to
their varying starting points of their systems of public financial management that different
countries go about the infrastructure process differently, there is also a common feature among
countries in that the delivery of infrastructure services is inherently intergovernmental or “multitier”. These twin messages neatly frame the topic of this Symposium to one of the many areas
of Dana’s expertise: the poly-centric (decentralized) nature of infrastructure assets that provide a
range of services designed to meet basic, but at the same time, varied and complex, social and
economic needs in a manner that addresses a multiplicity stakeholder interests.2
Richard Bird frames decentralizing infrastructure theme by posing several questions: which type
of organization will design, build, finance, and, eventually own an infrastructure project? Will
that organization be a general or special purpose government, a regional public entity, a state
enterprise or other agency reporting to government(s), or a privately regulated instrumentality, or
a donor? And, once those questions are addressed, who will then be accountable for monitoring
the capital asset and who will the monitoring agent be accountable to? Once the monitoring
accountability links are established, how is that monitoring be documented or measured? Is
infrastructure monitoring about tracking facilities maintenance (inputs)? Measuring a flow of
services (outputs)? Or an assessment of a project’s social and economic benefits and costs
(outcomes)? 3 Or all of these? And, are decentralized agents capable to carry out the
monitoring task? If not all, then which monitoring task(s) are they capable of undertaking and
what is the practice?
The focus of this paper is on the last set of these questions -- that of the capacity and the practice
of decentralized infrastructure monitoring. The experience and practice of low, middle and high
income countries alike is considered. The paper is organized as follows: the next section, Section
2, defines how infrastructure is defined for purposes here, and then proceeds to discuss where the
monitoring of infrastructure fits into the broader activity of decentralized infrastructure
management. Section 3 then lays out some of the “pre-conditions” for effective decentralized
monitoring of infrastructure, leading to the conclusion that for many developing countries these
pre-conditions are not satisfied and, thus, why in order to make useful statements about
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure one turns to specific case studies for lessons learned
from current practice. Accordingly, Section 4 focuses on a mix of illustrative country practices
on governmental monitoring of infrastructure that serve to reinforce the conventional view that
though there are core lessons common to all intergovernmental societies, there is no single
1

Yilmaz, Vaillancourt and Dafflon (2012) , Ch.4 review the general case. Martinez-Vazquez and Frank (this volume); Aschauer
(1989), World Bank (1994) examine the case of infrastructure.
2
Bird (1994); NRC (1995).
3
Bird (1994)
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“best” approach since each country faces different starting and end points to which they aspire. 4
Section 5 reviews selected non-governmental and civil society role in what the paper labels as
decentralized “bottom up” monitoring. Concluding comments are provided in Section 6.
2. Multi-Tier Infrastructure Management

Definition and Scope
The term “infrastructure” has been used in different ways by different authors in different
contexts. In this paper infrastructure is defined as long- useful life publicly provided physical
assets –capital spending --used in in economic production and by households.5 But even with
that definition, what counts as “core” infrastructure varies across countries and sectors. Thus,
for rural areas, local roads, irrigation networks, community water boreholes are core. For urban
systems facilities such as inter-connector roads and highways, tram systems, power and
telecom, supply-to-point-of- distribution water systems, wastewater (sewerage and storm water),
and street lighting dominate. Complementing the focus of the physical infrastructure as
discussed here is the social overhead capital of schools, health clinics, general government office
buildings, post offices, sports and entertainment facilities, fire and police stations, and prisons.
The infrastructure management process can be depicted has having two stages: creation of the
physical infrastructure (planning and implementation of infrastructure investment) and utilization
of a physical asset: operation and maintenance of infrastructure. The monitoring activity partially
overlaps the first stage (investment and implementation) and the entirety of the utilization stage
(Figure 1).6 The monitoring function overlays three activities: planning, implementation, and
operation and maintenance (O&M). In multi-tier government systems, different
types of
governments may be responsible for different functions. Some aspects of infrastructure
management may also be taken on by non-governmental institutions; accordingly, both
governmental and non-governmental monitoring will be discussed below.

4

Thomas (2006). p.3
Thus excluded from the discussion here is both the fully privately provided and the public-private partnership, also important
topics, but that are adequately discussed elsewhere; e.g., World Bank (1994) and Dannin and Cokorinos (2012).
6
The questions of functional assignment and finance are discussed by Bird, de Mello and Sutherland elsewhere in this volume.
5
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Figure 1. The Infrastructure Management Sequence

Infrastructure
Investment
Planning

Infrastructure
Investment
Implementation

Operation
(Service Delivery)
&
Maintenance

Four Models
For a start in setting the intergovernmental (decentralized) monitoring context, four
arrangements can be identified (Table 1).
1. National planning and implementation, subnational maintenance. Infrastructure can be
created by the national government and then transferred to subnational governments for
operation and maintenance. Water infrastructure in Albania is an example of this type of
arrangement.
2. National planning, subnational implementation. Infrastructure can be planned by the
national government and implemented by subnational governments. In Vietnam, for
example, the central government sets investment priorities for most infrastructure
projects while provincial and local (provincial) governments act as the central
government’s agents to implement the central decisions. As an agent the role of the
province is to prepare investment proposals for central government approval.
3. National goal setting, subnational planning and implementation. Infrastructure can be
created by the subnational governments according to the goals and plans of national
governments. In People’s Republic of China the central government sets investment
priorities across and within sectors, including the setting of targets and timetables for
infrastructure coverage in different classes of cities. Subnational governments implement
the centrally established policies and standards, but may have authority to plan where and
how the local infrastructure is implemented and maintained.
4. Devolution. Subnational governments can make their own choice of infrastructure
investment priorities and manage throughout infrastructure creation and utilization.
However, the central government may have a role in planning and finance. The classic
case that of the United States with its 50 unitary “state” governments and its nearly
90,000 local governments. Nearly three out of five of those local governments are special
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(rather than general) purpose governments, and of those, a fourth are organized as special
districts for the sole purpose of the delivery infrastructure services as defined above.7

Table 1. Stylized Governmental Arrangements in Subnational Infrastructure
Option

Infrastructure creation

Infrastructure utilization

Example

Planning

Implementation

Operation & Maintenance

1.

N

N

S

Albania

2.

N

S

S

Sierra Leone
Vietnam

3.

N, S

S

S

China

4.

S

S

S

Indonesia
Philippines
United States

Note: N: National government, S: Subnational government

The Monitoring Phase
As depicted in Figure 1, the monitoring task begins once the planning and investment steps are
completed. There are two aspects of the monitoring phase.

7



Monitoring implementation of infrastructure investment aims to ensure infrastructure
projects are implemented on time, within budget and with the intended output goals met.
Implementation monitoring thus focuses on cost, timeline and quality of infrastructure
construction and, at its most basic level, requires comparisons of project progress against
project plan. Accordingly, an effective monitoring process should be able to detect
project construction cost overruns and delays in a manner that allows for timely
corrective actions. 8



Monitoring operation and maintenance of infrastructure is to ensure that created assets
achieve desired outputs and outcomes over their useful life, and that the assets are
properly maintained over their life cycle. Monitoring infrastructure operation and
maintenance focuses on output and outcomes of operation and cost of operation and
maintenance, and at its most basic level, requires comparison of operation outputs and

US Bureau of the Census (2012)
Nonetheless, in even the most technically and administratively advanced of countries some timelines will not be
met and cost overruns will occur. A cross-country study by the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative shows
that more advanced countries like the U.K. have much lower cost and time overruns than developing countries like
Ethiopia and Malawi. (CoST 2011). However, the evidence is not confined specifically to subnational projects.
8
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outcomes against the infrastructure design. Accordingly, an effective monitoring process
should be able to detect any underperformances and their causes so that relevant solutions
can be made timely to restore adequate performance.
Infrastructure can be monitored by those who plan, finance, manage, own and/or use the
infrastructure, a division of roles that will vary by country and by sector. In principle, the
manner in how these tasks are arranged in a multi-tier system of government begins with the
sorting out of expenditure and revenue assignment arrangements as discussed by Bird, DeMello
and Sutherland in this volume. Though there are generally accepted “assignment rules” for a
well–designed (over time) multi-tier system, such sorting out will vary due to the political and
fiscal architecture that is unique to each country case.9 Thus, in some cases, the parties that
plan and finance infrastructure may also take on the monitoring role as in Vietnam whereby the
central government not only plans infrastructure projects, but then also assumes the monitoring
role that in other countries may be carried out by a regional (e.g., in Vietnam, provincial) or
local government. There are also countries such as Sierra Leone where the central government
plans infrastructure, but then does not monitor local implementation of the plan. And, in
Albania only localities that receive central subsidies for water infrastructure operation and
maintenance report to the central government about their financial needs, though with this
arrangement is it is often the result that center does not receive full information it seeks.
In a devolved system like the United States (U.S), where central government directly accounts
for only about 15% of total infrastructure investment, the central role is largely limited to that of
monitoring environmental outcomes, a role that often leads to the central government’s
promulgation of national environmental standards and regulatory practices for projects that in the
center’s judgment (which can be challenged in court) create negative externalities across state
borders. 10
And, in many countries the monitoring process can be heavily influenced by civil society
organizations through mechanisms such as citizen “report cards” or other forms of citizen
feedback activities (e.g., public hearings, establishment of government established advisory
groups). In Germany citizens can go directly to a readily accessible website of add their voice to
the infrastructure monitoring process.11 This citizen/civil society role is further discussed below.
3. Pre-Conditions for Effective Decentralized Monitoring
The “Gaps to Solutions” theme of this book well fits the practice of decentralized monitoring
of infrastructure. But, in the context of decentralized governance, the gaps are not just that of the
monitoring process per se; rather, the problem is that in many countries the infrastructure
practice never even gets to a stage that permits a subnational monitoring role. To paraphrase
Kornai, a pre-condition for effective decentralized monitoring of infrastructure is that there is a
9

Wallace (2003).
U.S. CBO 2008: 4-5. See Kaiser and Vinuela (this volume) for cross-country data on governmental infrastructure spending.
11
For the German practice see http://www.bmvbs.de/DE/Service/Baustellenmelder/baustellenmelder_node.html
10
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well-designed, functioning of political and fiscal decentralized authority of infrastructure to
begin with. And, for that “well - functioning" system to be a reality, central and subnational
governments alike must have developed the capacity to be intergovernmental.12 However, due to
the reality that at present much of the world , particularly the developing world, is still at the
early stages of becoming intergovernmental, there is little evidence of effective decentralized
monitoring other than the episodic.
If one looks at a conventional textbook expenditure assignment matrix that links broad categories
(e.g., water supply vs. distribution) on a vertical axis with generalized economic and engineering
criteria for “which type of government does what”, the assignment of the monitoring
responsibility seems to be straightforward. For example in the case of water supply and
distribution, national (or maybe even supra- national) entities have the intergovernmental
responsibility for water supply and subnational (e.g., local) governments take on the local
pipeline/ water distribution role. That is the broad first cut at the question of “which
government” should then take on the monitoring function.
But, as Table 2 reveals (and even here there is heroic simplification of the complexity of the
nature of all the decisions that require monitoring by some entity or entities), when one gets in
the “small stuff” there is no often bright-line between supply and distribution.13 Thus, in the case
of water management the conventional assignment exercise would assign the monitoring of the
source-to-distribution point of a water flow to a central or regional authority, with the local
government then taking on the monitoring of pipeline distribution to households and businesses.
But, upon a closer look when takes into account externalities (e.g., is the local tap water safe to
drink so as to avoid bad regional health outcomes?). It may turn out that the central (local)
authority has a high monitoring interest in the occurrence of, say, local management of (central)
pipeline leakage, reservoir/storage capacity, and water pressure. Similarly, the central (local)
authority has a high interest monitoring water quality in order to be able to assess willingness to
pay and, thus, the structure of general vs. user financing (Table 2).14 None of this is to say that
these monitoring issues cannot be sorted out among governments, but rather to stress the point
that to get it “right” will require both central and subnational governments (and not just general
purpose governments) to be intergovernmentally capable as a pre-condition to how monitoring
will work in multi - tier systems. 15

12

Kornai (1992).
Gershberg (2006) provides a country illustration of this complexity for allocation K-12 education tasks among different types
of governmental authorities.
14
The topic of financing infrastructure is addressed in this volume by de Mello.
15
And add to this the reality of the asymmetric capacity to govern, let alone be intergovernmental, in many developing countries.
See Dafflon (2006), 271-305 and Congleton (2006), 131-154.
13
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Table 2. An Illustration of a Conceptual Framework Checklist: Decentralization of the Infrastructure
Monitoring Function
Framework and System Inventory for Monitoring
Generic Goals
Decentralization: Determinant of
Scale and Jurisdictional Coverage

Economic

System size
Productivity

System cost

Economic Health

Degree of cost recovery

Environmental

Technology
Quality

Area of Extent

Poverty reduction

Distribution of general
(distribution of
population
flow of services)

Distribution of poverty

Employment
Population
stimulus








Framework and System Inventory for Monitoring
Water Supply &
Decentralization : Determinants of
Distribution
Scale and Jurisdictional Coverage
Goals
Provide adequate, 
Meters and capacity protocols
reliable source of
of main supply system (e.g.,
water
pipeline)
Ensure general

Meters and capacity protocols
public health
of local distribution systems
User safety

Treatment plants
Access to

Storage capacity
Employment and

Reservoirs (natural and
Schooling (&
constructed)
gender

Pipe leakage
economics)
Access to poor

←Who Monitors? →
Institutional
Considerations

Formal vs. Informal
Institutions

Conventional vs.
Traditional
Governance

Collectivity:
Governmental or
CSO/CDD?

Political “level” of
government having
a benefits stake in
the goals

Political: general or
special purpose?

Monitoring Measures
Output
Outcomes







←Who Monitors? →
Institutional
Considerations









By system
Ownership (by
whole or parts;
public vs. .private?
By agent that
financed the project
plan and
implementation
Service area users
General or special
purpose government
Intergovernmental
cooperative
Major users (e.g.,
industrial)

Availability per
unit of time (per
unit of time such
per hours; on
demand? peak?)
Technical
productivity(output
/unit input)
User Satisfaction
(and, thus,
willingness to pay)
Safety
Environmental
Externalities








Willingness to pay
User “report card”
(formal and/or
informal)
satisfaction
Public health and
safety
Environmental
considerations
Equity
(distribution of
costs, benefits,
consequences)

Monitoring Measures
Output
Outcomes









Gallons delivered
Pipeline Pressure
(main supply and
local distribution)
Storage rate (e.g.,
% of capacity to
store)
Leakage/loss rates
Consumption per
unit user
Financing: user
charges vs. general
finance
Lifeline user
payment
arrangements
Water pressure








Public
health/disease
incidents
Maintenance
tracking/disruption
of service rates
Poverty reduction
service and
catchment areas
Poverty reduction
access to water (to
the home?)
Willingness to pay
Economic growth
and employment
stimulus

Note: This presentation is not designed for a bullet-to-bullet cross table reading. Thus, for example, the Column1 generic of employment stimulus
may relate to one or more of the bulleted entries in columns 2-4. Source; Adapted from U.S. National Research Council (1995)

An illustration for the lack of decentralized monitoring of infrastructure is found in the
decentralization of the water sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While some aspects of
infrastructure management have been decentralized, monitoring responsibilities have not been
decentralized accordingly. Based on the World Bank’s recent study of the institutional
arrangements in water infrastructure in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, out of 19 countries
surveyed, 17 countries have some aspects of decentralized infrastructure management (Table
3).16 However, there is a disconnect between the type of government (typically subnational)
authority that creates and utilizes the water infrastructure services (Table 3, Columns 2 and 3)
16

World Bank, Urban and Sector, Country Sector Notes, 2012. Unpublished as of this writing.
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and the authority, typically national, that monitors (Table 3, Column 4). Moreover, only four
countries, Albania, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and Turkey report that monitoring of
infrastructure is part of the overall strategic planning process. This lack of decentralized
monitoring of infrastructure well fits the argument that if there are no pre-conditions for
decentralization, one cannot expect to find a decentralized role for multi-tier infrastructure
monitoring.
Table 3. Institutional Arrangement in Water Sector Management , Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2012
Country

Infrastructure
Creation
Authority
Regional

Regional

Infrastructure
Utilization Monitoring
Authority
National

National/Regional
National

None
None

NA

Azerbaijan

National
National

Belarus

Municipal

Municipal

None

Yes

Bulgaria

Regional

Regional

National

No

Croatia

Municipal

Municipal

National

No

Czech Republic

Municipal

Regional

National

Yes

Georgia

Regional

Regional

None

NA

Hungary

Municipal

Municipal

National

No

Kazakhstan

Municipal

Municipal

None

NA

Lithuania

Municipal

Municipal

National

No

Moldova

Municipal

Municipal

National

No

Poland

Municipal

Municipal

National

No

Romania

Municipal

Regional

National

No

Serbia

Regional

Regional

National

No

Slovak Republic

Regional

Regional

National

No

Turkey

Municipal

Municipal

National

Yes

Ukraine

Municipal

Municipal

None

No

National

No

Albania
Armenia

Infrastructure Utilization
(O & M) Authority

Municipal
Municipal
Uzbekistan
Source: World Bank, Urban Water Notes, 2012 (unpublished).

Use of Monitoring in
Strategic Planning
Yes

NA

Note: NA: Information not available

Organizational Capacity
The matter of becoming intergovernmentally capable enough to have a discussion about
infrastructure monitoring in multi-tier systems is not only about whether individuals in
subnational governments are adequately trained for the task; rather, it is the failure having the
organizational and institutional capacity in place for the system as a whole. The World Bank’s
Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) report on the evaluation of the Banks’ support or

10
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capacity building found that “individuals are often trained for specific tasks before the
organizational framework has been reformed to allow them to use the training effectively”.17 In
short, if a country is not broadly organized to be intergovernmental—that is, if its system of
political and fiscal decentralization is flawed from the start in that the fundamental questions of
“which government does what” has not been sorted out, well, then, so much for a decentralized
monitoring.18 As Martinez-Vazquez and Frank note in their summary paper to this volume,
such organization capacity is a “first aspect of the decentralization and infrastructure and hand”.
Yes, there can be a deconcentrated dispersion of responsibilities to monitor within a central
bureaucracy, and central-to-local agency delegation is also an option; but, from a conceptual as
well as empirical perspective, this is not multi-tier or decentralized governance.19
But, that said, for this discussion of infrastructure monitoring it is useful set aside the conceptual
argument regarding the degree of organizational capacity required for a country to be
“decentralized” and accept the proposition that if there is a degree of deconcentration and/or
delegation with authority—that is, regional/local branches of central offices are created with an
ability to make decisions independent of the center—there is, therefore, some degree of a de
facto decentralization system.20
Institutional Capacity
Regardless of the degree of organizational capacity, the capacity to be decentralized—and,
therefore, carrying out a decentralized task as key as monitoring of infrastructure-- is incomplete
unless there is an institutional capacity to be multi-tier. By institutional capacity, one is referring
to whether “the rules of the game” (e.g., relating to the assignment of the monitoring function)
are linked with sustained performance of both entities responsible for service delivery (such as
ministries and their agents, local governments) and individuals responsible for delivering results.
21
Now a question is: what is the incentive structure of the local staff to effectively monitor
local infrastructure to meet the interests and needs of their communities? If in the end the final
reporting procedures and rules that the local-in-the field staff are those that
address/promote/satisfy the goals of the central ministry or department, then for effective
decentralized infrastructure monitoring to work there must be the happy case that the goals and
incentives of central ministry or department staff happen to coincide with the desired outcomes
of the end users of infrastructure services. However, the history of centralized governance leads
one to conclude that there will likely not be such a happy coincidence. A good illustration is that
of the pre- 1990s socialist systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia whereby the policy of the
central authority, the supra-national Soviet Union that planned infrastructure for its nation-states,
17

Thomas ( 2006), p.1; World Bank(2005).
Ebel and Yilmaz (2007) and Smoke, Kaiser and Eaton (2010)
19
Not all analysts are willing to so readily to formally rule out deconcentration or delegation as viable forms of decentralization.
E.g. see Amin and Ebel (2007)
20
Smoke and Taliercio address the nature of “deconcentration” vs. “decentralization” for Cambodia. Smoke and Taliercio
(2007),70
21
Thomas (2006), p 2.
18
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was to build–but- then-ignore local infrastructure, with the result that the pay and promotion
incentive of the “decentralized’ (e.g., county) local field staff was go along with the same
incentives as their central managers responded to.22
But, one not need reach back to Soviet socialism to note this problem of a breakdown in the
institutional capacity for effective decentralization of infrastructure monitoring. The
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank reports that “only about one third of
the projects reviewed in Africa were clear about the relationships among organizational,
institutional, and individual capacity.”23 In its work the IEG found that though a “lot of effort
was devoted to fixing weaknesses in organizational capacity, the main problem was poor
incentives for staff” and, furthermore, that “individuals were too often trained for specific tasks
without reforming the [institutional] framework to let them use the training effectively”.24 Thus,
if one makes what for many places is the heroic assumption that the organizational capacity for
decentralization—and therefore decentralized monitoring—is in place, one still runs into the
problem of failure of the institutional to be effective.
The water sector in Albania provides a good example of how the lack of an institutional capacity
to monitor locally.25 Albania initiated a process to decentralize the water sector in 2000 when
the Organic Law defined water sector service as a function of local government units.26 The
principal mode of decentralization was the transfer of ownership of water utilities from the
central government to local government units (LGUs). This was accomplished either by
detaching rural independent systems from existing utilities and transferring them to the
communes, or through direct investments in stand-alone systems in communes, financed by the
central budget or by foreign donor organizations. Then the new systems were passed onto LGUs.
By 2007, the decentralization was considered largely complete with 83 percent of the total
number of utilities having been transferred, involving 76 percent of municipalities and 88 percent
of communes, and serving 53 percent of the population.27 But, even though these organizational
arrangements were effected, performance of water sector did not improve after the
decentralization. Continuity of water service remains low, at only 11 hours per day, compared
with Western European Benchmark of 24 hours per day. Utility staff per 1000 connections is
about ten while the benchmark is only 2. Monitoring of water infrastructure has not improved. It
was weak with the central government before decentralization and continues to be weak under
the ownership of LGUs due to the lack of intergovernmental capability and institutional capacity
to monitor. Two failures of institutional capacity are particularly evident. First, a five-year
business plan is considered as a benchmarking tool that would facilitate LGUs to monitor
22

Alm and Buckley (1994); Bird Ebel, Wallich (1995).
World Bank (2005)
24
Thomas (2006)
25
This section draws on World Bank (2011b)
26
Article 10 of the Organic Law of Albania.
27
However, the transfer of two of the largest water companies, Tirana and Durres, serving 37 percent of the population, has not
been completed yet. Mayors of Tirana and Durres have refused to accept the utilities’ transfer without guarantees of ongoing
financial support from the central government. World Bank (2011b).
23
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performance of water companies. However, per the de facto “rules of the game” there is no legal
obligation for water companies to prepare and submit such a plan to the central government or to
the LGUs. Second, LGUs can monitor the performance of water companies against a
performance agreement between an LGU and a water company; but, again, the de facto “rules”
are such that none of the transferred water companies has concluded such an agreement with
their LGUs because most LGUs do not have sufficient revenue to fund the operating and
maintenance of water infrastructure.28 In sum, though the Albanians got the organizational
framework ‘right”, there was no follow up to make the intergovernmental institutional
arrangement capable of carrying out its monitoring task.

Individual capacity.
Even if both the organizational and institutional capacity is in place, there remains the matter of
the capacity of individuals—the staff—to be able to be decentralized. In Nigeria the Lagos State
government has attached high importance to monitoring and evaluation of infrastructure projects.
Monitoring is primarily undertaken by the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate in the state
Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget (MEPB), and supported by the Project
Implementation Monitoring Unit (PIMU) in the Governor’s Office and an Independent
Consultants Monitoring Team.
Implementing ministries, departments and agencies submit quarterly reports to the MEPB and
PIMU and explanation is required for cost variances. MEPB and PIMU review project costs and
benefits and make quarterly monitoring and evaluation reports. These reviews are, however, not
as detailed as expected because of inadequate technical skills. Projects are to be stopped if
irregularities are discovered by the MEPB or PIMU, but this rarely happens.
Despite Lagos government’s stated effort in improving monitoring, it is still weak as
characterized by a low quality of monitoring reports. To compensate there has been a Personal
Assistant to the Governor in infrastructure project monitoring and evaluation. Moreover, the
Governor’s Office has collaborated with the World Bank mission in Nigeria to build the capacity
of monitoring and evaluation of state Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, and the
Project Implementation Monitoring Unit (PIMU) in the Governor’s Office. However, low
individual capacity still constrains quality of monitoring.
4. Case Studies.
As the forgoing discussion reveals, it makes little sense to talk of “decentralized monitoring of
infrastructure” in a country if the pre-condition solutions involving organizational, institutional
and individual capacity is not in place. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from both
28
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“top-down” and “bottom-up” case examples—practices that the IEG notes that when it comes to
the practice of project monitoring and evaluation, “can be more art than science”. 29 And, taking
that cue, there are several case studies that give guidance of how one can move from gaps to
solutions. It is also true that in closing these gaps, there is opportunity for developed and
developing to learn from each other. Though there are good examples of a well-designed
intergovernmental systems of subnational monitoring of infrastructure projects, there is also
ample evidence of monitoring failures—or, at least of the failure of policymakers to use the
monitoring information presented to them-- in “advanced” decentralized countries (ASCE,
2006).
Adopting the same stylized format as above (Table 1) for presentation of multi-tier
infrastructure and utilization arrangements, one can link the phases of creation and utilization to
that of monitoring (Table 4). Thus, for example, in central officials coordinate on infrastructure
implementation and O &M, but then make monitoring a wholly central function (Table 4). In the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) the role of which government finances is determinate
whereby the central government monitors only the projects that receive large amount of central
subsidy. In China, the central government is part of the planning process but, then does not
generally monitor locally implemented and operated infrastructure. The US provides the classic
devolution case—four “Ss” in a row.
Table 4. Stylized Governmental Arrangements of Monitoring Implementation of
Infrastructure Investment

Infrastructure creation

Infrastructure
utilization
Operation &
Maintenance

Monitoring of
implementation

Example

Planning

Implementation

N

S

S

N

Chile

N, S

S

S

N, S

South Korea

N, S

S

S

S

China

S

S

S

S

U.S.

Note: N: National government, S: Subnational government
Chile has a strong top-down monitoring of infrastructure projects.30 Project implementation is
systematically reported and carefully reviewed as part of the budgeting process and project costs
are controlled with performance an effective use of performance budgeting. This is
accomplished by combining a mature appraisal system for project design with a strong National
29

30

Thomas (2006), p3.

Arancibia (2013).
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Investment System (SNI) that facilitates the monitoring of project implementation. The Ministry
of Planning and Ministry of Finance jointly monitor project implementation through reports
submitted by the financial unit in regional governments to the ministries and through the SNI.
Implementing agencies in the subnational governments then report to the financial unit in
regional governments about project implementation. All information relating to investment
initiatives and projects from formulation to appraisal and implementation is recorded in the SNI
and posted in the Integrated Projects Bank (BIP). This information includes a listing of contracts
and the expenses with each expense item being paid out and the contracting company receiving
(i) the payment; (ii) ex ante cost estimates; (iii) the requested resources by item, and (iv) the
assigned resources.
For sectoral monitoring and evaluation, a deconcentrated regional agency supervises and
monitors the project implementation and the reports to relevant line ministry. For example, a
regional Health Authority monitors the implementation of infrastructure for health and reports to
the Ministry of Health. For education, it is the Superintendent for Education that supervises
project implementation and reports to the Ministry of Education.
Regarding cost monitoring during project implementation, investment initiatives must be
reassessed whenever the tendering process yields costs in excess of ten percent of the estimate.
In this case, the institution formulating the project or the institution financially responsible must
provide the analysis with all of the technical and economic information required to justify the
cost increase. The project will then be re-appraised using the new information. Once the reappraisal is done and resources earmarked, the goal is for no further change in project costs.31
In the Republic of Korea, the central government monitors local infrastructure projects that
receive more than 30 bn. Won (about 30 million USD) from the central government subsidy.
Local governments as implementing agencies annually report to the Total Project Cost
Management System in the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then compares the
project implementation status with the project planning for a given project and decides on the
merits of further funding of the project. For projects that receive less than ₩ 30 bn. the role of
monitoring is assigned to local governments. The Local Finance Law provides the legal
framework for the local government monitoring of these projects. 32
In the People’s Republic of China, growing reliance on extra-budgetary funds has reduced
government’s control over spending units and, thus, local accountability to the center. 33 Thus
by default, China provides a case which there has been decentralization of infrastructure
31

Chile, in which the entire infrastructure process is highly centralized, can be judged as having an advanced public investment
management system. A recent study of a sample of 387 regional investment projects (eight percent of total regional projects)
before 2007
showed that only twenty eight percent of regional projects had time overruns and actual costs at completion were five percent
lower than estimated at appraisal. Arancibia (2013).
32

Kim (2013).

33

Wong 2012.
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(including monitoring), but a decentralization that can be characterized having insufficient
funding and little oversight.34 China does have National Key Construction Projects Monitoring
Office with special agents assigned to each province to monitor selected projects for policy and
legal compliance, disbursement of funds, project progress, tendering, and construction quality.
However, their role is limited because oversight is confined to only budget funded projects
which are only a small portion of infrastructure projects in China.
Local investment corporations (LICs) 35 have been established to provide funds for local
infrastructure and have come to play a key role in financing infrastructure in many localities.36
However, there is no systematic oversight, monitoring and evaluation of infrastructure
investment by LICs. According to Wong, “[a]t the national level no agency has been assigned
the responsibility for oversight of their activities – not the Ministry of Finance (MoF), nor the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Construction (MoC)
or the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). In the absence of national guidelines,
management and supervision of LICs by local governments varies greatly across localities.”37
In the U.S., a highly decentralized country, subnational governments typically manage local
infrastructure investment from planning to implementation. Most of the states in the U.S. have an
effective process for monitoring infrastructure construction. A recent assessment on
infrastructure performance in all fifty states finds that ten states have high performance on
monitoring infrastructure construction, thirty eight at middle level and only two states at low
ranking.38 The practice of infrastructure monitoring in the U.S. states reported during 1999 –
2008 suggests that effective monitoring can be achieved when there is a comprehensive, frequent
and systematic collection of performance data and effective use of the data collected in
budgeting and intervening in project implementation. 39
Some U.S. states improved their infrastructure monitoring between 2005 and 2008 by making
more frequent reports and shortening time for corrective action. For example, project monitoring
was much better in Wyoming state in 2008 compared to 2005 because its Department of
Transportation effectively reduced the average time to correct problems from months to weeks
since workers must now immediately notify project managers of problems or concerns. In Ohio
state meetings are regularly held between project managers and contractors on the progress of
capital projects who review reports on cost overruns, delays and safety compliance. The result
34

Subnational government share of total budgetary investment has increased over the past three decades (up to 88.8% in 2007).
Wong 2013a: 9.
35
“By design, LICs are complex hybrid financial organizations that mix public (fiscal) and private (financial) funding to engage
in both public and private (profit-making) activities. As such, they bear similarities to public-private partnership arrangements in
other countries. In China, though, the government is the only participant and decision-maker.” (Wong 2013a:17).
36
“The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) estimated that LICs accounted for about two-thirds of local government
debt in 2009. More recent estimates, based on findings by the National Audit Office and the central bank, is that the total debt of
LICs is likely to have reached CNY 10 -14 trillion by year-end 2010 – as much as 45 per cent of current GDP” (Wong 2013a: 1718).
37
Wong 2013a: 18.
38
Pew (2008).
39
Ibid.
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is that the state architect is able to respond more quickly to solve problems, such as providing
solutions relating to inefficiencies, quality issues, and cost overruns. The Ohio solution
response time ranges from one to two weeks for (typically civil-engineer) identified efficiency
and quality matters and to up to two months to address costs issues identified by financial
analysts. Alabama state improved its monitoring by focusing on collection of data on
performance that allows quarterly adjustment for it performance budget reports. In New Mexico
state officials instituted a bottom-up performance review process that includes weekly reports
from project managers that allows the state to respond within a week for most cost overruns,
delays, inefficiencies, and quality concerns, and, often within one day, for safety issues.40
A recent survey of member states Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) finds that all national and regional governments answering the survey reportedly
monitor implementation of infrastructure investment in one form or another.41 The majority of
countries report (15 of 19 respondents to the survey) that some forms of performance
monitoring of public investment projects are conducted at central government level (Figure 2).42
This includes the use of performance indicators as well as the formulation of objectives defined
in form of target values. An example is the Urban Solid Waste Management project Galicia
(Spain), which is one of European Union’s (EU) pilot regions using outputs and outcomes
indicators as a central mechanism for management infrastructure investment funded by EU.43 It
is an example of a project subject to strong external constraints that have influenced its design
and development. 44Monitoring requirements established for the two major EU Structural Funds,
the European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund, often include reporting
requirements, requirements related to the spending timeframe, the prioritization of policy areas,
co-financing requirements, additionally requirements, the use of ex ante economic evaluation
tools as well as the use of environmental impact analysis.45 EU practice is summarized in Box 1.

40

Ibid.
OECD (2012) and Charbit and Gamper (this volume).
42
The survey question is “Do central levels or supra-national authorities monitor the use of public investment funding in your
sector that goes to sub-national governments over the course of implementation?” One country may report more than one
monitoring level.
43
Hulbert (2012).
44
The project consists of the construction of a set of facilities operated by the private-public company, Sogama) in the
municipality of Cereda, Galicia for the separation of recyclable materials and the incarnation of mixed waste with energy
recovery. With a project financing period of 1997-2010, the total investment costs were € 274 m (in €2011), 36% which was EU
financed through the Cohesion Fund with the remainder funded by Sogama. Sogama’s financing comes from its shareholders
(which includes the government of Galicia) and through private loans (Sartori and Catalano, 2013 and CSIL 2012).
45
European Commission 2012b.
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Box. 1 Multi-Tier Monitoring in European Union Structural Funds

The European Union Structural Funds are intended to reduce fiscal disparities among the member states.
These funds make up one of the largest items of the budget of the European Union (€ 278 bn. in 2013,
which is about 28% of the committed Community Budget, and of that about a third is earmarked for
infrastructure, largely for air, water, rail and road transport). To monitor these funds, the European
Council and Parliament define the priorities, tasks and organization of the funds, and make regulations
through the ordinary legislative procedures Monitoring of the EU structural funds is implemented in the
context of multilevel governance and is based on output and result indicators.46 Monitoring of outputs
means to observe whether intended services or products are delivered and whether implementation is on
track with respect to a set of common output indicators. Result indicators are variables that provide
information on some specific aspects of results that lend themselves to be measured. 47 As a national
policy, each EU Member State establishes a committee to monitor implementation of each funded
program in coordination with the European Commission (the Executive body of the Council). 48 At
the subnational level monitoring procedures are program-specific and dependent on organizational and
institutional settings of each member country. Galicia (Spain) provides an example of a region that is
applying outputs and outcomes indicators as a central mechanism for managing public investment funded
by EU funds. Compared to national or local funds for public investment, the use of EU funds involves
more extensive conditionality and monitoring, as well as a performance assessment report. Requirements
attached to EU funds include reporting requirements related to the spending timeframe, the prioritization
of policy areas, co-financing requirements, and the use of ex ante economic evaluation tools as well as the
use of environmental impact analysis. This focus on conditionalities and the related monitoring
procedures were judged as excessive by some Spanish authorities although there is agreement that EU
conditionality, monitoring and performance evaluation has contributed to a stronger focus on results,
particularly with respect to the main objectives of the closure of illegal landfills and the provision of a
more environmentally sustainable waste management system in compliance with EU and Spanish national
directives. The introduction of performance budgeting indicators in Galicia is further interpreted by many
as a pre-emptive policy from the regional government that anticipates further EU requirements.
Sources: European Commission (2012a, 2012b), Hulbert (2012), OECD (2012), CSIL (2012), and Sartori and
Catalano (2013).
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Figure 2. Level at which monitoring is performed in OECD countries
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Source: OECD, 2012. “Investing Together: Meeting the Co-ordination and Capacity Challenges across Levels of Government”.
A document submitted to Delegates of the Territorial Development Policy Committee for discussion and approval at the 28 th
session, OECD national questionnaire: multi-level governance of public investment in sectoral context, 2012. No Level refers to
lack of response to the survey.

Monitoring of regional infrastructure in non-OECD countries is less well established, which
implies that the potential for indicators to inform policy and improve outcomes overtime is often
not being realized in many developing countries. Indeed, the evidence shows that maintenance
in the transport sector in developing countries often suffered from underfunding and, in thus in
part by default, neglect.49 The evidence further shows that many countries in East Asia lack
standardized performance monitoring. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Cambodia are cited as countries that have not as yet established central institutions for routine
monitoring and reporting of infrastructure systems.50
Measurement
As countries develop the capacity to be intergovernmental and thereby make progress to toward
multi-tier infrastructure monitoring, a task to be managed will be that reaching of an
intergovernmental agreement on appropriate national and subnational guidelines, standards,
indicators on progress, intended outputs and outcomes.
Monitoring can be done according to mandatory standards, either absolute levels or as measure
of improvement from a base line. In principle, mandatory standards can be used as a condition of
capital grants; however, in practice such conditionality may not be applied For example, the
49
50

World Bank 2003.
Peterson and Muzzini 2003: 215.
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Indonesia’s DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus), a special purpose grant providing fund to subnational
governments that carried with it a requirement for performance measurement, nevertheless
failed to incorporate standards in account in the funding process.51
The selection of indicators and targets to monitor is the next important step if one is to capture
intended outcomes; but for this to work, subnational governments must not only have the “right”
incentives to perform the monitoring role, but also be in a financial position carry out its
monitoring task. For example, at first glance Changsha, the capital of Hunan province scored
well when monitored on wastewater treatment by national and regional authorities, but upon
further examination of the operations, it turned out that it was operating at only 50 percent or
less of designed capacity due to lack of funds for operation and maintenance.52 This is because
the higher level governments monitored only the infrastructure targets that were based on the
treatment capacity of completed wastewater treatment plants, a practice that omitted the
monitoring of volume of treated discharge or the quality of receiving water bodies. In this case,
Changsha operated its current wastewater treatment plants at half capacity by simply diverting
the remaining incoming flows directly into the Xiang River (a branch of the Yangtze River) at
the same time that it was planning to build a new wastewater treatment plants with higher
capacities. A similar problem arises when infrastructure targets such as cost targets specific to a
locality are imposed by a “higher” level of government on a local government, but then some
of the costs turn out to not be under control of localities.
Performance agreements can be arranged between central government and subnational
governments, between governments and service providing companies. For example, in Sierra
Leone, the Strategic Policy Unit in the President’s Office has performance agreements with
ministries, departments and agencies. In Albania, local government units are supposed to have
performance agreements with local-government-owned water companies so that they can
monitor the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure performed by these companies.
However, due to the lack of funding from the local governments to these companies, there has
been no commitment from these companies to the local governments to report on the
performance of these companies.
Monitoring Tools
Good practice suggests that the project planning and design should build in the monitoring
criteria. Weak planning without requirements on monitorable outcome indicators, progress
indicators and implementation beyond financing make it difficult for the government to monitor
progress towards clearly defined objectives. In many countries, however, the inclusion of
monitoring in planning is not common. For example, in the set of the nineteen Eastern Europe
and Central Asia countries surveyed by the World Bank, only four have monitoring
incorporated in strategic planning for water infrastructure (See Table 3). In a similar manner in
51
52
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Sierra Leone, the general lack of documented project objectives, projected timelines, and
appraisal analysis makes it almost impossible to assess whether a completed project has achieved
its intended objectives and whether the objectives were met on time at the approved cost. 53
Project reporting is another monitoring tool. It has been a good practice at subnational
governments to have reports on the project implementation progress submitted frequently (e.g.
quarterly) to a mayor. Governor or other representative body in an understandable format
accompanied by an explanation of delays, cost overruns, funding and construction problems and
proposed corrective actions.54 Yet, in some donor dependent countries, it is hard for the
government to monitor donor-financed projects because different donors impose their own
reporting format and the often-weak-capacity government is not capable to issue and/or enforce a
standardized reporting template. For example, in Sierra Leone, there are no national or sectoral
project implementation manuals nor standardized reporting templates with the result of a
monitoring system that is described very weak. 55
Progress meetings between project managers and monitoring agencies have also been shown to
increase the effectiveness of decentralized monitoring. In a study on public investment
management that included Arlington County, Virginia in the U.S, Petersen and Vu found that
weekly progress meetings held between infrastructure project managers and the county finance
officers resulted in an institutional ability to address implementation problems in infrastructure
project in a timely and effectively manner.56
The site visit is a useful monitoring tool in verifying visible effectiveness of an infrastructure
project and project reports. At the minimum, site visits would help detect such obvious problems
as ghost schools and ghost hospitals in a number of developing countries.57
Information system management provides another monitoring tool whereby all (or, at least
some core set) of information about infrastructure from planning to implementation and
operation and maintenance is recorded. A “good” information system report for project
construction includes project title, responsible department(s), and start date, estimated
completion date, key contact people, percentage of completion, funding, and budgeted vs. actual
costs.58 In Chile, all information relating to investment initiatives and projects from formulation
to appraisal and implementation is recorded in the National Investments System (SNI) and
posted in the Integrated Projects Bank (BIP). Many institutions interact within this system and
take part in the process of public investment management. The Ministry of Public Works also
uses the information recorded in the system to carry out its monitoring role.
53
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Performance management systems for monitoring combine the audit function with statistical
reporting. These have proved to be a useful monitoring tool, but can be difficult to establish at
subnational government level due to capacity constraints. Thus in China, although the National
Audit Office has achieved remarkable success in pushing for performance management reform
over the past 15 years at the national level, the progress in subnational government is limited due
to a lack in many local governments of a staff that is adequately trained in performance
evaluation. As a result, monitoring and auditing is constrained to financial compliance rather
than economic assessments, performance, and value for money.59
5. Bottom- up Monitoring: The Role of Civil Society
Developing Economies
Infrastructure management and monitoring may also be undertaken by citizens and civil society
community organizations. In community-driven development (CDD) projects, much (sometimes
all) of the management of the project from planning, implementing, operation and maintenance
is done by citizen organizations. Such infrastructure projects are often of small scale and may
receive support from international organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme along with support from
bilaterals and the central or local government. And there can be a demonstrable efficiency gain.
For example, Gross and others in their study on water infrastructure projects in 15 countries60
found that access to community households to services was higher and the services are more
sustained when women participated in monitoring project implementation.61. Local people
including women have good local knowledge about what works and what can be sustained. The
knowledge can be utilized when the agencies of water infrastructure projects “consult and listen
to them, and give them some responsibility for and influence on the quality of project
implementation”. 62
In Indonesia the World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program introduced a process for
citizen choice relating to small infrastructure projects for Indonesian sub- districts and as part of
that process explicitly includes support for building the capacity for community monitoring of
the “quality and effectiveness of infrastructure projects” (Wong 2003).63 Moreover, there some

59

Wong 2013b. A Kecamatan is a sub-district of a city or regency, which are in turn local government units of local
government “below” the provincial level.
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The study looks at a random sample of communities chosen from 18 projects in 15 countries, funded by a range
of donors, NGOs and governments. The sample comprises 88 communities that had managed and sustained water
supply systems for three or more years. 15 countries are from five regions: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in
Latin America, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia in East and Southern Africa, Cameroon and Ghana in West
Africa, Indonesia and the Philippines in East Asia, and India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in South Asia.
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The Kecamatan Development Project's objectives are to raise rural incomes, strengthen kecamatan and village government and
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evidence that the cost of monitoring is less than that of similar construction projects run through
a Ministry of Public Works contracts.64
In the Bangladesh a World Bank Social Investment Program Project (SIPP) was launched
(2003) that supported community monitoring through a citizens participatory processes
whereby information was collected regarding on spending projects ranging from rural roads to
tube wells. This information is publicly displayed in most villages and then communities
graded the performance of their Village Development Committees (VDCs) using a report card
mechanism. A social accountability framework was established to allow community members to
directly demand accountability from their leaders and service providers on infrastructure and to
participate in monitoring their performance (Box 2). 65

Box 2. Community Assessment Process in Bangladesh Villages
Fewer than two World Bank projects, a number of villages in Bangladesh have been applying a
Community Assessment Process (CAP) to assess the quality of public services including those of
infrastructure. CAP is a process through which village people participate in assessing the performance of
public services provided by their village committees and assuring the public services meet their needs. In
the process, the village council (Gram Parisad) identifies the services to be evaluated, the service
provider’s responsibilities, the planned and used resources, the outputs, and the indicators of performed
service. Service providers and service recipients separately assess the performance and quality of public
services through score cards in which they give scores to each of the identified public services,
justification for the scores and recommendations for future improvement of the service. Service providers
include Village Committee (Gram Samiti) and other committees such as Procurement Committee,
Finance Committee, and Sub-project Committee. Service providers and service recipients (village people)
present their score card results in a joint meeting with Village Council, discuss and agree on final
assessment. Then, service providers and recipients jointly prepare an action plan to improve the services.
Social Audit Committee monitor the implementation of the action plan and Village Council arrange CAP
every six months.
Source: World Bank, Social Investment Program Project in Bangladesh (2009, 2011a)

OECD Countries
Non-governmental “watch dog” organizations may also play an important role in monitoring
infrastructure that is managed by subnational governments. For example, in the United States, a

grants; (ii) technical assistance for implementation; and (iii) monitoring and (iv) policy studies.
www.worldbank.org/Kecamatan Development Project, May 13, 2013. Also see Wong (2003).
64
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65
Roughly two million people have been benefited from community infrastructure activities ranging from rural roads to schools
and tube-wells.
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well-funded non-partisan research foundation (Pew Foundation) conducts research and analysis
to develop a dialogue on issues of state infrastructure management (Box 3).66

Box 3. The Pew Performance Matrix, United States
The Pew Center of the Study of the States periodically issues infrastructure “report cards” on all fifty
U.S. states. Based on an explicit set of performance criteria, the grading has been done for four times in
1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008 in four management areas—Information, Infrastructure, Money and People.
Each of the four management areas received a score ranging from A to D (including the ten possible
grades of A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C, C-, D+, and D). The PEW studies assessed state infrastructure project
monitoring to determine whether a state has an effective process for monitoring infrastructure projects
throughout their design and construction. The criteria included that of whether a state (i) adequately
monitors, evaluates and detects project-cost overruns, delays and safety compliance; and (ii) effectively
intervenes to take corrective action, as necessary, in managing the construction of capital projects. Pew’s
state-by-state surveys are carried out by journalists and academics and involve interviews of elected and
appointed officials, questionnaires, and document reviews. The evaluations are based on data collected
from more than 12,000 different sources—including surveys, written documents and interviews with over
1,000 persons in all 50 states.
Source: Pew Center on the Study of the States (http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org), Grading the States
Report, 2008.

Also in the U.S every four years the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) releases an
on-line Report Card for America’s Infrastructure that depicts the condition and performance of
the nation’s infrastructure in the familiar form of a school report card by assigning letter grades
to each major type of physical infrastructure. The America’s Infrastructure Report Card
organized by both by state and by type and mode of physical infrastructure.67 The Report Card is
based on information for each of the infrastructure categories—including reports, studies,
articles, surveys and other research materials—from professional societies, non-profit
associations, and local, state and federal agencies. Civil engineers from across a given state then
use these materials to develop a detailed picture for the state, examining the condition of the state
infrastructure, its performance, funding and service capacity versus a measure of the capacity
“need’.68 Based on an explicit set of engineering criteria, grades are then assigned to each
category.
The Report Card provides grades and details of the state of infrastructure in a given locality and,
inter alia, estimates the costs to improve it for each category. Infrastructure categories examined
66

There are other assessments on infrastructure status and needs such as the American Society of Civil Engineers’ Infrastructure
Report Card, and annual reports on infrastructure needs and surveys of major projects by the Urban Land Institute and Ernst &
Young.
67
ASCE Report Card, http://www.ascecareportcard.org.
68
A word of caution: The engineer’s measure of infrastructure capacity “need” (typically workload x average unit cost) may
not the same as the economists concept of quantity demanded for a flow of infrastructure services(which accounts for change in
relative prices).
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include transportation (roads, bridges, dams, levees and ports), waste, water (drinking water,
storm water, waste water) navigable waterways, parks and recreation, rail, school, and transit.
The ASCE has archives of report cards so infrastructure states for a given locality can be
compared over time.
A report card on infrastructure in a given state includes:





A summary of state of infrastructure and its need for renewal
A mini report card, a summary of grades given in each infrastructure category
A summary of justification for grades given in each infrastructure category
A Citizen’s Guide, a detailed report of facts and analyses for each infrastructure category
and a guide for citizen’s understanding of infrastructure state of their locality and what
can be done to improve it.

Similar “watch dog” activities are occurring elsewhere. In 2012 in Canada a consortium of
professional engineering associations and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities recently
initiated the Canadian Infrastructure Report Card project that surveyed municipal road systems
and water systems (drinking, waste and storm water) in 123 municipalities in ten (10) of
Canada’s 13 provinces. The Canadian report is instructive for other countries contemplating such
“report card” monitoring in that because it was a first of its kind exercise for Canada’s
municipalities, it provides in addition to its main report and analysis a concluding section on
“Lessons Learned” regarding data requirements, data collection techniques, and how a survey
process may have to be adjusted to survey communities of different size and degree of
development.69
Two other countries that have developed community-based monitoring include Germany and
South Korea. In Germany, as noted above, there is a government-issued website whereby
citizens can provide their feedbacks on road construction across the country. .South Korea
provides project information upon request according to Information Disclosure Act (a process
that which often involves a long response time lag).

6. Concluding Comments
Countries commit millions…billions…of capital investment monies on infrastructure. The
reasons are well documented: physical infrastructure is about a society’s foregoing of current
consumption in order for future consumption. The societies that do this well become developed
societies. Those who do it poorly are …poor. Thus launches the infrastructure management
sequence: planning, implementation, operation and maintenance. Once one is past the planning
stage, the need to integrate monitoring into the next three steps of implementation, operation and
maintenance is crucial to making it all work. Quite simply, for the capital investment to create
69
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that platform for development one monitor to learn if the infrastructure management sequence
is working effectively and efficiently to provide for the flow of services that become that
platform for growth and poverty alleviation. The history of the world is replete with societies
that monitored infrastructure well and those that did not. Again, as a generalization (but a
reasonable one), to create, use and manage infrastructure well make a difference as to whether a
country will be developed or undeveloped; rich vs. poor.
Next the question arises: who monitors? As adequately documented elsewhere in this book,
spatial considerations reveal that except in a very few cases physical infrastructure has a multijurisdictional character. Within a country (which is the frame of reference for this book and
paper), that means that the monitoring task is inherently intergovernmental or “multi-tier”.
Moreover, as again reported elsewhere in this book but also referenced in several places in this
paper, the decentralization and monitoring of infrastructure has two types of payoffs. The first is
political: decentralization of provides a political vehicle for citizens to engage with and hold
accountable their government representatives. Indeed, in some cases—post conflict Cambodia is
an example—decentralizing infrastructure can be a strategy for a recreate a people’s trust in the
very notion of “their government”.
The second is economic: decentralization of infrastructure can have high efficiency payoffs in
terms of not the metrics of economic growth and poverty reduction, but also in the overall “wellbeing” of a people. But, for this result to be realized, that infrastructure must be technically well
monitored throughout the infrastructure management sequence. Here it should be clearly noted
that while decentralization of the infrastructure monitoring task has been shown to have payoffs
in terms of sustainability and efficiency, decentralization is not the sine qua non for
infrastructure generated development and poverty alleviation. It’s just that, as noted, it has been
demonstrated that when a country is intergovernmentally capable, there are economic gains from
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure.
But, one of the clear findings of this paper is that many countries are not ready for decentralized
monitoring. That is they have not met the “pre-conditions” of a well-designed (or, in many cases,
even a partially well-designed) intergovernmental system: there is gap to be addressed in terms
on of organizational, institutional or individual (or all three) types of capacity development.
This is the case for many countries. And, even when a country might be judged
intergovernmentally capable, it does not necessarily follow that it is getting its component of
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure “right”. Indeed, as pointed out in the above text,
project monitoring can be more art than science. It can also be more opportunistic than “well
designed”. And with those lessons, one can draw some conclusions regarding decentralized
monitoring of fiscal infrastructure. There are at five:
The first, which repeats the comments above, is that decentralized monitoring matters. There
are, or can be, measurable political and economic efficiency gains.
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Second, there should be clear guidance and standards for infrastructure monitoring at all
government levels. When there is a national or regional interest in how an infrastructure system
will work, national/regional s standards and targets should be discussed with the subnational
governments to insure that if monitoring is to be decentralized that the decentralized monitoring
unit can meet those standards and carry out its monitoring task in an autonomous manner. In this
context an example to avoid is that as cited in the text of a “local” staff that responds to central
government incentives for salary and promotion.
Third, decentralized infrastructure monitoring should be imbedded the full project management
cycle so that there is a multi-tier agreement on infrastructure service modalities (e.g., timelines,
funding, monitoring measures and tools, and outputs and outcomes).
Fourth, recognizing that every decentralized infrastructure project or system is different in some
manner than from all others, there are also many technical, political, financial, and economic
similarities for knowledge sharing from place to place. Different jurisdictions that have the same
type of infrastructure investment may nevertheless have different monitoring strategies,
measures and tools— and, that’s knowledge to be shared.
And fifth, community monitoring of multi-tier infrastructure can play an important role in the
monitoring, and thus, the delivery, of infrastructure services and should be encouraged. If
governments and civil society agencies cooperate in providing reliable information and
feedback, the case for decentralized monitoring will be enhanced.
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